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PEOPLE v. RINCON-PINEDA: RAPE TRIALS
DEPART THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY-
FAREWELL TO LORD HALE
In the recent case of People v. Rincon-Pineda1 the California
Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's refusal to give one of defend-
ant's jury instructions which had previously been held to be mandatory
in sexual offense cases.2 This decision undercut the rationale for the
three-hundred-year belief that the defendant in a sexual offense case
requires greater protection than other criminal defendants. The reject-
ed instruction provides:
A charge such as that made against the defendant in this
case is one which is easily made and, once made, difficult
to defend against, even if the person accused is innocent.
Therefore, the law requires that you examine the testi-
mony of the female person named in the information with
caution.3
This language constitutes the rationale used by courts of other jurisdic-
tions, including Oklahoma, to justify treating sexual offense cases in a
manner which not only affords the defendant greater protection than
other classes of criminal defendants, but also subjects the complaining
witness to a stricter examination than that given to other types of
witnesses. This note examines the traditional judicial treatment of
sexual offense cases in light of the California Supreme Court's decision
in People v. Rincon-Pineda to determine if this treatment has any
contemporary factual or legal justification.
A. Tm CASE OF RINCON-PINDA
Factually, Rincon-Pineda involved a victim sleeping alone in her
apartment who, fearing for her life, submitted to a dozen acts of sexual
assault by the defendant. Upon her positive identification of defendant,
1. People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119
(1975).
2. People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 426 P.2d 161, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967);
People v. Nye, 38 Cal. 2d 34, 237 P.2d 1 (1951).
3. CALTIC No. 10.22 (Cal. Jury Instrs., Crim. (3d ed. 1970)), quoted in People
v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d at--, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
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he was arrested and charged with rape,4 oral copulation5 and attempted
sodomy.' The trial judge instructed the jury that it could interpret from
the evidence that the victim was a woman of unchaste character.7 How-
ever, believing that California Jury Instruction 10.22 was demeaning to
the victim, the judge refused to give it at the second trial. The defend-
ant was convicted8 and appealed on the sole basis of the trial judge's
failure to give instruction 10.22.
In affirming the defendant's conviction the California Supreme
Court held it was error for the trial judge to refuse the instruction, but
that such error was not prejudicial. Cataloguing the other protections
afforded the defendant,9 the court found that the language of instruction
10.22 was inappropriate in any context, disapproved its further use, and
stated that cases to the contrary should no longer be followed.
Historical Findings of the Court
The language of instruction 10.22 originated in the seventeenth
century with the writings of Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Chief Justice of the
Court of Kings' Bench from 1671 to 1676.10 His technical discussion
of the felony of rape touched upon admission of evidence from infants
and in this context he pronounced:
But in both these cases, whether the infant be sworn or
not, it is necessary to render their evidence credible, that there
should be concurrent evidence to make out the fact, and not
to ground a conviction singly upon such an accusation with or
without oath of an infant.
For in many cases there may be reason to admit such
witnesses to be heard, in cases especially of -this nature, which
yet the jury is not bound to believe; for the excellency of the
trial by jury is in that they are the triers of the credit of the
4. CAL. PENAL CODE § 261 (West 1970).
5. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a (West 1970).
6. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286, 664 (West 1970).
7. CAIRC: No. 10.06 (Cal. Jury Instrs., Crim. (3d ed. 1970)) quoted it People
v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d at -, 538 P.2d at 251-52, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
8. There were two trials of defendant. The second trial differed from the first in
that the victim was more specific about the illumination allowing her to recognize de-
fendant, she was represented by counsel and she refused to answer questions about her
past sexual conduct. The first trial ended in a hung jury.
9. These protections are judicial comments on the evidence and jury instructions.
The court held that credibility instructions applicable to all witnesses were to be given
henceforth in all trials where the victim testifies, that instructions on weighing conflict-
ing testimony were to be given henceforth where no corroborating evidence is required,
and that a new instruction should be used in every case where testimony conflicts.
10. 1 M. HALF, ISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THm CRowN (1st Amer. ed. 1847)
[hereinafter cited as HALE].
[Vol. 11:279
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witnesses as well as the truth of fact; it is one thing, whether a
witness be admissible to be heard, another thing, whether they
are to be believed when heard.
It is true rape is a most detestable crime, and therefore
ought severely and impartially to be punished with death; but
it must be remembered, that it is an accusation easily to be
made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by
the party accused, tho never so innocent.1
Hale then recounted two trials which occurred while he sat on the
bench. Both cases involved young girls whose accusations of rape
proved to be completely fabricated." He concluded the chapter:
I only mention these instances that we may be the more
cautious upon trials of offenses of this nature, wherein the
court and the jury may with so much ease be imposed upon
without great care and vigilance; the heinousness of the of-
fense many times transporting the judge and jury with so much
indignation, that they are over hastily carried to the convic-
tion of the accused thereof, by the confident testimony some-
times of malicious and false witnesses.' 3
An evolutionary process transformed these words into instruction
10.22 which was to be given sua sponte by the trial court.' 4 Hale's
reference was to uncorroborated infant witnesses in rape trials.' 5 The
California instruction became mandatory in all sex offenses regardless of
the age of the prosecutrix or the amount of corroboration.' 0
Contrasting the state of seventeenth century criminal procedure
with modem due process the court in Rincon-Pineda demonstrated that
Hale's caution was reasonable during his time. In the seventeenth
century the accused was expected to address the jury17 without benefit
of counsel. 18 He was not presumed innocent, and to convict him it was
not necessary to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 9 Further-
more, his rights to present witnesses in his defense and to compel their
11. Id. at 634 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 634-35.
13. Id. at 635.
14. People v. Nye, 38 Cal. 2d 34, 237 P.2d 1 (1951).
15. See text accompanying note 11 supra.
16. People v. Merriam, 66 Cal. 2d 390, 426 P.2d 161, 58 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967);
People v. Nye, 38 Cal. 2d 34, 237 P.2d 1 (1951); People v. Putnam, 20 Cal. 2d 885,
129 P.2d 367 (1942).
17. 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CEhnNAL LAW OF ENGLAND 440 (1883)
[hereinafter cited as STEPHEN].
18. 2 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 575, at 684 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter
cited as WiGMOR].
19. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 454-59 (1895).
1975]
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attendance at trial were barely nascent.2" Therefore, the defendant was
"often pitiable, even if he ha[d] a good case." 21  However, the court
reasoned that today Hale's caution is "superfluous and capricious" 22
since the accused has all the safeguards of constitutional due process. He
is entitled to be represented by competent counsel,23 to present witnesses
and compel their attendance at trial,24 and to be presumed innocent
unless proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.25
Hale himself did not view every allegation of rape a potential
fabrication; he pointed out the desirability of leaving the question of
witness credibility to the jury.26 He considered the best test of credibili-
ty to be the facts and circumstances surrounding the case.27 The court
found nothing in Hale's writings to suggest that victims of sexual offense
are presumptively entitled to less credence than victims of other
crimes. 28
Empirical Findings of the Court
By examining empirical data, the court concluded that the charge
of rape is not so easily made and difficult to defend against as to warrant
a mandatory cautionary instruction in the nature of jury instruction
10.22.29 In supporting its conclusion that rape is not a charge easily
made, the court cited statistics showing that rape is a grossly underre-
ported crime due to strong deterrents operating on the victim. 0 These
deterrents include the emotional trauma of the investigatory process, the
fear of subsequent humiliation and publicity, demeaning trial defense
tactics, and the police process of deciding whether the rape was "victim-
precipitated."'" Of those rapes reported, police determine an estimated
20. WIGMoRE, supra note 18, at 685.
21. STEPHEN, supra note 17, at 442.
22. 14 Cal. 3d at -, 538 P.2d at 257, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
23. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1970); Coffin v. United States, 156
U.S. 432, 453-56 (1895).
26. HAILE, supra note 10, at 634.
27. Id. at 633.
28. 14 Cal. 3d at -, 538 P.2d at 256, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 128.
29. Id. at-, 538 P.2d at 257-60, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129-32.
30. Id. at -, 538 P.2d at 258, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 130. See, e.g., M. AMER, PAT-
TERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 27-28 (1971); FBI UNmoM CRME REP. 15 (1973) [herein-
after cited as FBI RnPo rs]; Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and
Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919, 921 (1973); Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement:
Repeal not Reform, 81 YAIE L. J. 1365, 1374-75 (1972).
31. 14 Cal. 3d at -, 538 P.2d at 258, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 130. See, e.g., M. AMIR,
PATIERNS IN FORCmILE RAPE 29 (1971); Amir, Victim Precipitated Forcible Rape, 58
J. Cpim. L.C. & P.S. 493 (1967); Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A Fem-
inist View, 11 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 335, 348-51 (1973).
[Vol. 11:279
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15 percent 2 to 29 percent 3 are unfounded and the investigation termi-
nates. 4 Even after arrest, California reports indicate that the police
released 28 percent of the alleged rapists.35
Furthermore, the court found that once a rape charge gets to trial it
is no more difficult to defend than other charges2 6 FBI crime reports
show that of the four violent crimes, forcible rape has the highest rate of
acquittal or dismissal and the lowest rate of conviction for the offense
charged.3 7  California state statistics reflect this trend with the rate of
acquittal in rape cases being exceeded only by that of bookmaking
cases.
38
A leading analysis of jury behavior further supports the court's
conclusion that it is unlikely the accused will be convicted capriciously
by an inflamed jury.3 9  Indeed, juries often acquit or find guilty of a
lesser offense a rapist who is clearly guilty.40 The jury redefines the
crime in terms of its notions of assumption of risk, especially where the
prosecutrix and defendant are not strangers or where there is no evi-
dence of violence to her person.41 The jury closely scrutinizes the vic-
tim and, where it finds contributory behavior on -her part, tends to be
lenient with the accused even though physical harm to the victim is es-
32. FBI REPORTS, supra note 30, at 15.
33. M. AMIR, PATIERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE 29 (1971).
34. 14 Cal. 3d at-, 538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
35. Testimony of David G. Miller, senior crime studies analyst, Bureau of Crim.
Stat., Cal. Dept. of Justice, in Transcript of the Hearing before the Assem. Crim. Justice
Com. and the Cal. Commission on the Status of Women (Los Angeles, Oct. 18, 1973)
as cited in Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d at -, 538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
36. 14 Cal. 3d at-, 538 P.2d at 257, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 129.
37. FBI REPORTS, supra note 30, at 116. Table 18 is reproduced below.
1973 DISPOSITION OF PERSONS FORMALLY CHARGED BY THE POLICE
(3,090 CITIES) 4 VIOLENT CRIMES
No. of Percent Guilty Percent
Persons Offense Lesser Acquitted or
Offense Charged Charged Offense Dismissed
TOTAL 2,141,347 58.8 4.9 17.9
Murder-
Manslaughter 3,234 39.7 19.9 29.1
Forcible Rape 4,657 28.5 13.0 36.3
Robbery 23,075 29.6 9.9 25.3
Aggravated Assault 38,756 33.6 13.6 35.9
38. CAL. DEP'T OF JusTiCE, CME AND DELINQUENCY IN CAL., 1972, Adult Prosecu-
tion reference tables (1973), table 9, at 16, cited in People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.
3d at -, 538 P.2d at 258, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
39. H. KALvEN & H. ZEisEL, THE AMnlucAN JuRY (1966) [hereinafter cited as
KALVEN & ZEISEL].
40. Id. at 254.
41. Id. at 252.
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tablished.42 More expert evidence is presented in these cases than in
burglary and drunk driving trials. 43 In none of the cases included in the
jury study did the prosecution rely solely upon the testimony of the
prosecutrix.' The court also found that proof by the state in rape cases
is more difficult than in other types of cases.45 A rape trial is no more
likely to turn on a credibility contest between the victim and the ac-
cused than is a case of nonsexual assault.46
On the basis of these findings, the court disapproved its instruction.
Cautioning trial judges not to use Hale's language, the court stated that
such language "now performs no just function, since criminal charges
involving sexual conduct are no more easily made or harder to defend
against than many other classes of charges, and those who make such
accusations should be deemed no more suspect in credibility than any
other class of complainants. '47
Implicit in the opinion is the court's effort to elevate the victim's
status in the eyes of the law. The court noted, for example, that the
victim felt that she was the defendant at the trial.48 Although the court
could have considered other areas, such as the attitudes of trial judges
toward rape victims49 and the myths endemic in society regarding the
crime of rape,50 its findings are borne out in a major statistical study, 1 as
well as a major historical study52 released since publication of the court's
opinion.
B. ThE EFFECT OF RINCON-PINEDA ON APPELLATE REvIEw
Sir Matthew Hale's words have not only been the basis of the
mandatory jury instruction used in California and other jurisdictions 8
42. Id. at 249, 251.
43. KALVEN & ZEisEL, supra note 39, at 143, cited in People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14
Cal. 3d at--, 538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
44. Id. table 39, at 141, interpreted in People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d at -,
538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
45. 14 Cal. 3d at-, 538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
46. KALVEN & ZFSEL, supra note 39, tables 40-41, at 142-43, interpreted in People
v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d at -, 538 P.2d at 259, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
47. 14 Cal. 3d at-, 538 P.2d at 260, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 132.
48. 14 Cal. 3d at-, 538 P.2d at 252, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 124.
49. Bohmer, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape Victims, 57 JuDICATum 303 (1974).
50. See, e.g., S. BROWNmiLLER, AGAmNsr OuR WmIL, MEN, WOMEN AND RAPP
(1975); Comment, The Rape Victim: A Victim of Society and the Law, 11 WILLAmE-rn
L.J. 36, 50-51 (1974).
51. See Tulsa Daily World, Oct. 27, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 2.
52. See S. BROwNMILm, AGAiNST OuR WILL, MEN, WOMN AND RAPE (1975).
53. E.g. State v. Dodson, 67 N.M. 146, 353 P.2d 364 (1960) (refusal of instruction
is reversible error); State v. Yates, 239 Ore. 596, 399 P.2d 161 (1965) (instruction may
[Vol. 11:279284
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 11 [1975], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol11/iss2/6
1975] RAPE TRIALS 285
but they have also been the basis of required corroboration of the
prosecutrix' testimony54 and the rationale behind exceptional appellate
scrutiny of rape convictions.55 In light of the persuasive findings of the
California court which undercut the rationale embodied in Hale's words,
the inquiry of this note shifts to the question of whether Hale's rationale
can justify exceptional appellate scrutiny applied to sexual offense con-
victions. Oklahoma is used as a representative jurisdiction since it
practices this exceptional scrutiny and its low rate of convictions and
high rate of acquittals in forcible rape cases mirror that of the nation.56
Rape in Oklahoma is a capital offense with a five year minimum
sentence.5 7  Neither corroboration of the prosecutrix' testimony, viol-
ence to the person of the victim, nor emission are statutorily required for
a conviction. 58  As a practical matter, however, some of these items are
usually present in successful convictions59 and are lacking in rever-
be given at the discretion of the court). In State v. Feddersen, 230 N.W.2d 510, 515
(Iowa 1975) the court disapproved the instruction, saying it arbitrarily singles out rape
victims as a class whose credibility is suspect. "In eliminating the requirement of cor-
roboration of a rape victim's testimony, the legislature rejected this concept as a dis-
credited anachronism. We now do likewise."
54. E.g. Black v. State, 120 Ga. 433, 47 S.E. 180 (1904). The corroboration re-
quirement has been thoroughly discussed in other articles and will be noted here only
as it applies to exceptional appellate scrutiny. See, e.g., Note, Corroborating Charges
of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. Rnv. 1137 (1967); Note, The Rape Corroboration Require-
ment: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE LJ. 1365 (1972).
55. E.g. People v. Kazmierczyk, 357 Ill. 592, 192 N.E. 657 (1934); People v.
Mixter, 8 Ill. App. 3d 531, 290 N.E.2d 705 (1972); Carmicle v. Commonwealth, 452
S.W.2d 378 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Ables v. State, 331 P.2d 954 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
56. Oklahoma Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports Div., 1974 State
Total, Annual Return of Persons Charged. The statistics below are accurate but may
not be complete according to Uniform Crime Reports Project Director David Murdock
in letter and conversations with author. The letter is on file at the University of Tulsa
College of Law Library.
1974 Oklahoma Disposition of 4 Violent Crimes
Percent Percent Adults Guilty
Determined Total No. As Less. Percent
Offense Unfounded Charged Charged Offense Acquitted
Murder-Manslaughter 28 180 28.9 11.6 26.1
Forcible Rape 37 211 18.5 4.7 33.6
Robbery 5 726 40.6 3.7 26.4
Assault, Felonious 4 1,442 42.1 6.1 29.6
57. OKLa. STAT. tit. 21, § 1115 (1971). (1965 Amendment lowered the previous
minimum sentence of 15 years.)
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111 (1971).
59. See, e.g. Maxey v. State, 526 P.2d 951 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (live sperm
present); Saylor v. State, 506 P.2d 589 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (prosecutrix was cor-
roborated); Holmes v. State, 505 P.2d 192 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (prosecutrix was
corroborated); Hurd v. State, 502 P.2d 1276 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972) (sperm present);
Goodson v. State, 354 P.2d 472 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960) (pregnancy).
7
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sals. ° All criminal convictions may be appealed. 61 As a general rule, the
appellate standard of review is a sufficiency of the evidence test; where
evidence is legally sufficient to submit to the jury, although conflicting,
the court will not go beyond its scope of review and delve into the
facts.62  The credibility of witnesses and the weight and consideration to
be given their testimony are the exclusive province of the jury."3 Osten-
sibly, this is true even though the crime has occurred under evanescent
circumstances; the testimony of one witness will suffice for conviction.0 4
Testimony by noncriminal witnesses, including informers, presents no
exceptional credibility problem on appeal.65
However, the general rule for appellate scope of review has a well-
recognized exception which is applied in appeals from convictions of
sexual offenses. 60  This class of convictions is given a
careful examination of the whole record to [the] end that it
may justify [the] sentence imposed notwithstanding [the] gen-
eral rule that, where there is any evidence to support [the]
verdict or where evidence is conflicting, [the] appellate court
will not examine [the] record to ascertain or determine [the]
weight of such evidence, and [the] verdict approved by [the]
trial judge will be permitted to stand.6 7
60. Louis v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. 156, 222 P.2d 160 (1950) (no evidence corrobo-
rative of infant such as blood and pain from ruptured hymen, prosecutrix was not
nervous and upset, prosecutrix reported act to her brother and not to her mother); How-
ard v. State, 79 Okla. Crim. 247, 153 P.2d 831 (1944) (physical condition of prosecutrix
did not show force claimed, pajamas not torn, contradiction in prosecutrix' testimony);
DeWitt v. State, 79 Okla. Crim. 136, 152 P.2d 284 (1944) (insufficient corroboration);
Sowers v. Territory, 6 Okla. 436, 50 P. 257 (1897) (prosecutrix was not corroborated).
61. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1051 (1971).
62. Racy v. State, 520 P.2d 375 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (illegal delivery and dis-
tribution of marijuana); Wiebe v. State, 473 P.2d 348 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970)
(forgery); Harris v. State, 448 P.2d 296 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968) (manslaughter);
Townley v. State, 355 P.2d 420 (Okla. Crim. App. 1959) (assault with a dangerous
weapon).
63. Caudill v. State, 532 P.2d 63 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (defrauding innkeeper);
Jones v. State, 468 P.2d 805 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970) (burglary).
64. White v. State, 518 P.2d 1112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974) (burglary-only witness
was complaining witness); Quarrels v. State, 502 P.2d 1293 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972)
(robbery-only witness was complaining witness); Davis v. State, 490 P.2d 775 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1971) (assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill-only witness was
prosecuting witness).
65. Spriggs v. State, 511 P.2d 1139 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (informer was a
known drug user).
66. Johnson v. State, 380 P.2d 284 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963) (sodomy); Stout v.
State, 96 Okla. Crim. 88, 248 P.2d 1059 (1952) (indecent exposure); Maxwell v. State,
78 Okla. Crim. 328, 148 P.2d 214 (1944) (rape); Cape v. State, 61 Okla. Crim. 173,
66 P.2d 959 (1937) (assault with intent to rape). Each of these cases received close
scrutiny of the entire record.
67. Goodson v. State, 354 P.2d 472, 474 (Okla. Crim. App. 1960) quoting from
286
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The prosecutrix' testimony must be "clear and convincing, and where it
bears upon its face inherent evidence of improbability, is contradictory,
inconsistent or unreasonable, it will be held as insufficient . -" The
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma has established a policy of
scrutinizing the quantity as well as the quality of the evidence in rape
appeals, looking to evidentiary weight when it would not do so in other
classes of appeals. 69
The modem trend is to apply this policy selectively. Some recent
cases have totally ignored the exception and appear to use the same
standard of review for rape convictions as for other appeals. 70 How-
ever, Meeks v. State7' demonstrates that the court still considers the
exception viable. The Meeks court stated clearly that the weight of the
evidence was the exclusive province of the jury and that the court would
not interfere but still exercised its prerogative to peruse the victim's
credibility by attaching significance to the fact that her testimony was
corroborated. 72
In 1909, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Reeves v. Territory,7"
declared that the prosecutrix was not an accomplice and that, hence-
forth, her testimony need not be corroborated. Lack of corroboration
was to be considered by the trial court along with other facts and
circumstances in advising the jury to acquit or in considering a motion
for a new trial. The late Judge Barefoot, in his widely cited opinion,
Weston v. State,74 drew not upon Reeves but upon an earlier supreme
court decision, Sowers v. Territory.75 In Sowers the court quoted Hale
in justifying an exception to the ordinary rules of appellate procedure in
rape cases.76 The prosecutrix in Sowers was seventeen years old and
not an infant whose credibility is subject to attack merely on the
basis of age. Thus, on the basis of Hale's caution, a questionable
exception was incorporated into Oklahoma appellate review of rape
Louis v. State, 92 Okla. Crim. 156, 157, 222 P.2d 160, 161 (court syllabus par. 4)(1950).
68. Maxwell v. State, 78 Okla. Crim. 328, 334-35, 148 P.2d 214, 217 (1944).
69. Ables v. State, 331 P.2d 954, 961 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958). "Ordinarily, this
court is not to judge the weight of the evidence .... But, on cases of this character,
an exception to the general rule is recognized .... "
70. Carpenter v. State, 530 P.2d 1049 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Jones v. State, 527
P.2d 169 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
71. Meeks v. State, 540 P.2d 584 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
72. Id. at 587-88. The court noted that the adult prosecutrix was corroborated by
a police officer.
73. 2 Okla. Crim. 351, 359-62, 101 P. 1039, 1042 (1909).
74. 77 Okla. Crim. 51, 138 P.2d 553 (1943).
75. 6 Okla. 436, 50 P. 257 (1897).
76. Id. at 438-39, 50 P. at 258.
1975]
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convictions. Weston applied the exception in statutory rape.77  Later
cases, relying on both Sowers and Weston, have applied the exception to
adult and infant prosecutrices indiscriminately.78
The Oklahoma policy of exceptional appellate scrutiny is founded
on fundamental error. Hale's words, relevant in his time, no longer
apply in the light of modem criminal due process. In view of
the low rate of reporting, arrest, and conviction of forcible rape
in Oklahoma, rape is clearly not a charge easily made and diffi-
cult to defend. Indeed, Judge Barefoot's analysis in Weston that
the appellate scrutiny rule had a reason based on the fifteen year
minimum and death maximum sentence no longer applies.79 The
accused does not need the protection of exceptional scrutiny to defend
himself adequately. He has the safeguards of general credibility in-
structions, s0 directed verdict, new trial, and appeal. Exceptional scruti-
ny will continue to be afforded the rare appeal where constitutional
questions or racial issues are raised."'
The victim in a rape case is placed in a position similar to that of
an accomplice. s2 Close scrutiny of her testimony as a routine matter
suggests that she is presumptively less credible than other witnesses. Her
testimony must often be corroborated in a crime usually committed in
secretive circumstances. Victims of other assaults are not similarly
treated in court.8" They are presumed to give truthful testimony unless
77. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1114 (1971). "Rape committed by a male over eighteen
years of age upon a female under the age of fourteen years. . . is rape in the first de-
gree."
78. E.g. Ables v. State, 331 P.2d 954 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958) (adult); Maxwell
v. State, 78 Okla. Crim. 328, 148 P.2d 214 (1944) (infant).
79. The minimum Oklahoma penalty is now five years. See note 57 supra. While
the death penalty has not been statutorily amended, it may well be constitutionally in-
firm since the holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). It is noteworthy
that two of the three petitioners in Furman were sentenced to death for rape. The Court
reversed their convictions.
80. Fletcher v. State, 20 Okla. Crim. 300, 101 P. 599 (1909) (credibility instruc-
tions must apply to all witnesses).
81. Exceptions to the usual scope of review have been judicially developed for ex-
traordinary circumstances. The death sentence has traditionally received a review of the
entire record, e.g. Hathcox v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 110, 230 P.2d 927 (1951). Perjury
receives extraordinary evidentiary treatment as well as careful review, e.g. Madden v.
State, 26 Okla. Crim. 251, 223 P. 716 (1924). Appeals alleging constitutional error re-
ceive close scrutiny, e.g. Wright v. State, 285 P.2d 445 (Okla. Crim. App. 1955) (unfair
trial); Johnson v. State, 84 Okla. Crim. 368, 182 P.2d 777 (1947) (racial discrimina-
tion). Each of these exceptions applies to cases involving extreme facts.
82. See, e.g., Fritts v. State, 487 P.2d 1188, 1191-92 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
83. See, e.g., Christy v. State, 496 P.2d 405 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972); Davis v.
State, 490 P.2d 775 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); Townley v. State, 355 P.2d 420 (Oka.
Crim. App. 1959).
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bias is shown. Their credibility is a matter of fact for the jury. Appel-
late courts restrict themselves to a review of questions of law in the usual
case. 4  Barring exceptional circumstances where racial prejudice or
constitutional questions arise, rape cannot be said to require extraordi-
nary appellate review.
The Oklahoma legislature recently elevated the status of the victim
by enacting a prior chastity evidentiary ban.85 It is incumbent upon the
Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma to review its former treatment
of the victim, with a view toward similarly elevating her status to that of
any other victim.
C. CONCLUSION
There are several dangers inherent in continuing the practice of
close appellate scrutiny. Potential for abuse of discretion always exists
when the court relies on a rule without reason. Additionally, scrutiny
of a "cold" record without benefit of seeing or hearing the witnesses
testify and, in effect, second-guessing the jury on the facts, renders jury
verdicts meaningless. Judge Simms, specially concurring in Household-
er v. State,8 6 emphasized this danger:
While the right of trial by jury is, without question,
primarily for the benefit of an accused, nonetheless, every
citizen has a vital interest in the protection of that constitu-
tional right free from undue interference from those members
of the judiciary who first reach a conclusion, then attempt to
justify that conclusion through serpentine-like rationale.
Judge Simms argued that when the court reads the record it should
do so not as advocates but as judges, searching for legal error and,
absent legal error, give credence to the jury's verdict.88 Close appellate
scrutiny implies that juries are not capable of rendering unbiased ver-
dicts. As the previously mentioned jury study suggested, if bias exists,
it appears to be in favor of the defendant8 9
A further result of adherence to this policy is the immeasurable but
definite influence it has on trial judges, prosecutors and the police. The
determination by law enforcement agencies that many rape charges are
unfounded cannot be attributed to deliberate falsification by the com-
84. E.g. Smith v. State, 51 Okla. Crim. 31, 299 P. 229 (1931).
85. OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 750 (Supp. 1975).
86. 501 P.2d 1112 (Okla. Crim. App. 1972).
87. Id. at 1127 (Simms, J., specially concurring).
88. Id.
89. KALtvN & ZEISEL, supra note 39, at 249, 251; People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal.
3d at-, 538 P.2d at 258, 123 Cal. Rptr. at 130.
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plainants since numerous deterrents to reporting operate on the victims.
It is submitted that police departments are aware of evidentiary require-
ments and the credibility shadow placed upon victims by judicial scruti-
ny. Police may be moved to consider as unfounded cases where the
victim's word is not corroborated, or where the facts will not permit
exceptional scrutiny. Prosecutors and trial judges are acutely aware of
what evidence will be held insufficient on appeal. A chilling effect on
the entire justice system can occur when the highest court's policy is to
question the credibility of rape victims.
It is submitted that no area of rape law, whether it be jury
instructions or appellate scrutiny, can be justified by the phrase "rape is
a charge easily made and difficult to defend against." These words
have no contemporary validity in any context and wherever the law
reflects their use, the law must be reconsidered. Rape is not an excep-
tional crime requiring exceptional judicial measures. The only extraor-
dinary fact is that convictions for rape are excessively low. The courts'
treatment of victims may have contributed to the statistics. In the
interests of society, the defendants and the prosecuting witnesses in rape
cases must be given the same treatment received by defendants and
prosecuting witnesses in other criminal offenses.
Mildred B. Dodson
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